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Book Review
CONFLICT OF LAWS, PART ONE: JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS.

By Albert A. Ehrenzweig. St. Paul: West Publishing Co.,
1959. Pp. XXXIV, 367. $6.00.
This is the first part (Jurisdictionand Judgments) of a twopart Treatise on the Conflict of Laws by Professor Albert A.
Ehrenzweig. Part One will eventually be republished along with
the forthcoming publication of Part Two (Choice of Law).
Professor Ehrenzweig needs no introduction in this country.
His valuable contributions in the fields of conflict of laws,1 insurance,2 and torts8 assure him a prominent position in our legal
literature. Now, his much reviewed Treatise4 is being added to
the list of accomplishments.
The present volume contains a general introduction and three
chapters, dealing respectively with "Local Jurisdiction," "Recognition of Foreign Judgments," and "Divorce, Annulment, and
Their Incidents." In detail, the general introduction is devoted
to a historical analysis of major doctrinal trends in the field of
American conflicts law, an argument for separation of international and interstate conflicts, and a discussion of sources,
such as international law, federal, and state law. Chapter One
deals with the problem of local jurisdiction, namely the question

whether a court may validly under its law and the Federal Con1. See, e.g., Adhesion Contracts in the Conflict of Laws, 53 COLUM. L. REv.
1072 (1953) ; American Conflicts Law in Historical Perspective: Should the Restatement be "Continued"?, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 133 (1954) ; The Transient Rule
of Personal Jurisdiction:The "Power" Myth and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L.$.
289 (1956) ; ParentalImmunity in the Conflict of Laws: Law and the Reason v.
The Restatement, 23 U. CHI. L. REv. 474 (1956); Interstate and International
Conflicts Law: A Plea for Segregation, 41 MINN. L. Rnv. 717 (1957) ; The Real
Estate Broker and the Conflict of Laws, 59 COLUN!. L. REV. 303 (1959).
2. "FULL AID" INSURANCE FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM: A VOLUNTARY COMPENSATION PLAN (1954).

3.

NEGLIGENCE WITHOUT FAULT: TRENDS TOWARD AN ENTERPRISE LIABILITY

FOR INSURABLE Loss (1951).

4. Book reviews: Rheinstein, 8 J. PuB. L. 550 (1959) ; Kelso, 58 MICH. L. REV.
306 (1959) ; Cheatham, 45 A.B.A.J. 1190 (1959) Inglis, NEW ZEALAND L.J. 169
(1959); Cavers, 47 CALIF. L. REV. 414 (1959); Hazard, 24 Mo. L. REV. 406
(1959); Stern, 1 INT. AM. L. REV. 455 (1959); Callahan, 70 BROOKLYN BARRIsTER 233 (1959) ; Reese, 12 J. LEGAL ED. 305 (1959) ; Currie, 73 HARV. L. REV.
806 (1960) ; Falk, 69 YALE L.J. 1311 (1960) ; Weintraub, 45 IOWA L. REV. 979
(1960).

See also Cleary, Cowen, Laflar & Schlesinger, Transient Jurisdiction-

Remnant of Pennoyer v. Neff-A Round Table, 9 J. PuB. L. 281 (1960).
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stitution render judgment, and further whether it will do so
("Will the court take jurisdiction?"). Subjects such as procedural capacity (active and passive) of individuals, corporations, and unincorporated associations, jurisdiction in rem and in
personam, and the problem of mandatory and discretionary dismissal are analyzed and discussed. Chapter Two is devoted to
the theory of recognition of foreign judgments, requirements
for, and mode, scope, and effect of recognition, including the
doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. The problem
of "international" and "interstate" jurisdiction is discussed in
the same chapter as one of the requirements for the recognition
of foreign judgments. Finally, Chapter Three is devoted to problems of local jurisdiction, and recognition of foreign decrees, in
proceedings for divorce, support, children's custody, and annulment of marriage.
In general, the arrangement of the subject matter follows a
rather coherent and consistent scheme, departing from traditional classifications to "unorthodox" formulations, in accordance with varying degrees of emphasis placed on requirements
for scientific elaboration or usefulness of the Treatise as a reference book for teachers, students, and practicing lawyers. Indeed, at times consistent analysis which "would necessitate much
new nomenclature" had to be sacrificed "to the exigencies of
practical use." 5 (p. 73) Thus, though failing in rigid consistency, the work gained in flexibility and accessibility.
I
Ehrenzweig's Treatise is a milestone of our literature in the
field of conflict of laws. It came at a time when traditional doctrine could no longer cope with a body of growing case law, and
a body of new doctrine remained scattered in countless valuable
law review contributions. It sealed a past, and may well furnish
the basis for a new beginning.
The Treatise is pervaded by a spirit of innovation, and is replete with inspiring ideas, which, though not always fully explored or carried to meaningful conclusions, may become the subject of discussion and further elaboration. The presentation of
5. See also p. 56 (passive procedural capacity of corporations has to be treated
under the heading of personal jurisdiction, an "analytically imperfect" arrangement). For a possible classification according to civilian notions which would have
permitted rigid consistency, see Rheinstein, Book Review, 8 J. PUB. L. 550, 554

(1959).
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both Jurisdiction and Judgments in a single volume should be
commended as a significant innovation. Such treatment necessarily focuses attention to the close interrelation of problems
involved in both areas and stresses the need for an integrated
approach to the question of satisfaction of reasonable expectations, which, indeed, is the central problem of all conflicts law.
In this connection should also be commended the inclusion in the
Treatise of such matters as procedural capacity, and the largely
ignored precepts of admiralty jurisdiction.
Among Ehrenzweig's several other significant contributions
which deserve attention are his continuous search for a historical explanation of present day dogma; his respect for treaty
law, a source of conflicts law frequently disregarded by counsel
and courts; his imposing collection of authorities and literature
of both common law and civil law origin; and his uncompromising effort at reformulation of obsolete rules swallowed up by exceptions, along with his insistence for more rationalization so
that unwieldy formulas could be reduced to more flexible equity
and other considerations.
As a typical example of Ehrenzweig's methodology in that
regard, attention may be called to his treatment of "international" and "interstate" jurisdiction, as one of the requirements for
the recognition of foreign judgments. In this area, Ehrenzweig's
main effort is directed at making explicit a number of inarticulate major premises pervading the cases in which recognition
was granted or denied in accordance with a finding that the
foreign court had or lacked "jurisdiction." That such a broad
formula can hardly be of assistance in understanding the past
and predicting future court action is made abundantly clear.
Ehrenzweig's analysis of what actually happens is this: while
compliance with the jurisdictional requirements prevailing at
F-1 is indispensable to judgment recognition, the final determination as to the "international" or "interstate" jurisdiction of
F-1 will be made in accordance with the law in force, and notions
of fairness, prevailing at F-2. Thus, in most cases, the finding
that the foreign court had or lacked jurisdiction is nothing more
than a statement of a conclusion: that the judgment will or will
not be enforced. On the basis of this analysis, Ehrenzweig is
able to contribute a number of suggestions deserving careful consideration as the need for more rationalization in this confused
area is broadly felt.
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However, Ehrenzweig's reformulations are not always convincing, and, at times, one has the uneasy feeling that an ought
is presented in terms of an is. This is, perhaps, the case with the
much-deplored rule of "transient" jurisdiction, which, in spite
of aphorisms to the contrary, seems to be still the law in the
United States. One may question the usefulness of Ehrenzweig's
optimism. Some courts, relieved of their obligation to follow an
allegedly no longer existing rule, might feel free to reach better
results; yet, the urgent need for law reform can be obscured
when a persisting anomaly - instead of being stigmatized outright - is presented as merely a ghost.
II

Some reviewers, limiting perhaps their scope of inquiry to
Ehrenzweig's introduction, expressed the opinion that the Treatise lacks a coherent theoretical framework and fails to manifest
a credo.6 It is not the purpose of a book review to refute criticism made by others; yet, this may be inseparably connected
with the effort of appraising the work under review and placing
it in proper perspective.
One may be censored for what he did and what he did not do
in connection with an overall effort to give a comprehensive picture (past, present, and future) of an entire branch of law, such
as conflicts; but an essentially eclectic approach should be appraised for what it actually is. Other treatises in the field of
conflicts may be "hopelessly out of date,"' 7 and an overall effort
for the clarification of past and present state of conflicts law
and doctrine, including accurate description, critical evaluation,
and suggestions for future development, should be welcome. But
the fact that no one seems prepared for such an undertaking,
and the scepticism which has been voiced with regard to possible success, and perhaps, desirability of such a project,8 may be
a partial answer. Ehrenzweig's courageous effort, at this stage,
should necessarily be limited in scope.
Within such limitations, Ehrenzweig was able to isolate
among a number of contradictory tendencies in conflicts doctrine
two elements which emerged as fundamental antinomies. Quite
6. See Falk, Book Review, 69 YALE L. J. 1311, 1316 (1960) ; Currie, Book
Review, 73 HBAv. L. REV. 801, 803 (1960) : Reese, Book Review, 12 J. LEOAL ED.
305, 306 (1959).
7. See Falk, Book Review, 69 YALE L.J. 1311 (1960).
8. See Currie, Book Review, 73 HARv. L. REv. 801, 809 (1960).
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convincingly, present day dogma is explained as a historical evolution of "unitarian" and "pluralistic" notions, and attendant
compromises thereof. There may be other reasons, too, which
may account for the chaotic state of law in textbooks and case reports. Yet, the conflict of pluralistic and unitarian notions, and
subsequent compromises which blurred clear vision, should be
fully clarified prior to a new beginning; and this is Ehrenzweig's
main concern. This may explain in part why Ehrenzweig did not
undertake a detailed critique of specific doctrines, and why he
refrained from inserting in his introduction doctrinal constructions of his own. If doctrine there must be, it is to be found in
the eloquent treatment of issues and cases in the Treatise as a
whole.
This brings us to a closer examination of Ehrenzweig's credo.
Conflicts law may not rest on "comity" because this is "no-law."
(p. 6) It cannot rest on public international law or any other
"super-law" ;9 (p. 6) indeed, public international law is not concerned with conflicts among national legislations beyond some
vague maxims pertaining mostly to flagrant abuses of national
sovereignty, and, apart from treaties, does not contain specific
conflicts rules. (p. 23 et seq.) Nor can the theory of "vested
rights" furnish us with a guide, as such theory is simply an
early borrowing from public international law and functions as
a counterpart to obsolete notions of "legislative jurisdiction"
transferred into the field of decisional law. (p. 9) The decisions
of three great judges, Holmes, Hand, and Goodrich, were
founded on obscure premises and resulted in compromise, and
this is also the case with the Restatement. The so-called theories
of local law did away with compromise but "left us without a
guide." (p. 15) A break-down of emerging new maxims into a
countless number of common law conflict of laws rules with a
limited scope would achieve "too little and too much." (p. 16)
Finally, isolation and examination of conflicting policies through
reliance on sociological and economic factors seem to be only a
partial answer. (p. 16)
Are we thus left "without a guide" by Ehrenzweig, too? If
we were to rely on the introduction alone, and if it were not for
9. One cannot but agree with Ehrenzweig that expecting too much from the

United States Supreme Court for the development of a consistent system of conflicts law based either on the due process or full faith clause of the Constitution

is contrary to both experience and present-day reality. The last pronouncement of
the Court in that regard seems to vindicate quite conclusively Ehrenzweig's ad-

monition. See Clay v. Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., 80 Sup. Ct. 1222 (1960).
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countless instances of critique addressed by Ehrenzweig to specific results reached by the courts in concrete cases, the answer
could be in the affirmative. But this, and the conspicuous absence of a doctrinal thesis may be taken as a doctrine in itself.
Thus, we should, perhaps, proceed to appraise Ehrenzweig's
work in the light of his refusal to be bound by doctrinaire and
conceptualistic formulas. However, on the basis of a study of
the Treatise as a whole, a number of propositions in the nature
of a credo may be established. A central theme is deployed with
masterful advocacy: doctrine, in order to be able to guide the
courts and lead to law reform, should be based on accurate functional observation of existing institutions rather than provide a
Procrustean bed of pre-conceived "logical" notions. The law is
to be found in the actual doing of the courts, apart from lipservice to obsolete rules and confusing terminology. The courts
must start from their own law, and should consider application
of foreign law in accordance with policy considerations pertaining to specific issues, and always in a concrete context; generalizations and reliance on "logic" alone may be harmful.
III
Ehrenzweig insists on the need for separate treatment of
international and interstate conflicts. His assumption seems to
be that, though inarticulate in most of the cases, such a distinction exists in fact, and also ought to exist. This approach has
aroused some scepticism, mostly as tending to encourage "provincialism" in an era calling for an internationalist rather than
isolationist outlook.' 0 The difference of opinion thus relates to
ideology and not only to method."
Distinct treatment of international and interstate conflicts
does not necessarily presuppose a commitment as to the desirability of development of two distinct bodies of law. Such treatment may be regarded as a research and educational device designed to focus attention to a number of policy considerations in
a concrete setting. In fact, such a method will enable us to de10. See Falk, Book Review, 69 YALE L.J. 1311, 1320 (1960). Of. Rheinstein,
Book Review, 8 J. Pun. L. 550, 557 (1959).
11. Apart from ideological orientation, the method of approach itself may make
little difference. Indeed, we may well start by drawing a line of demarcation
between international and interstate conflicts, indicating areas where concepts and
rules may be identical in both situations; we may equally well proceed to analyze
the conflicts situation on a common basis for both international and interstate
conflicts, and then draw attention to differences.
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termine whether the distinction is warranted by the law as is,
and further will enable us to decide whether it ought to be.
That such a distinction exists in fact has been amply demonstrated by Ehrenzweig's analysis. That such a distinction ought
to exist in connection with a number of concrete problems has
been equally well demonstrated. Indeed, the United States Constitution may compel deviations in the interstate field from an
internationally desirable rule. The states may enjoy partial
legislative independence under the Constitution, and may be regarded for some purposes as autonomous units in the community
of nations. But the states are also part of a Union whose interests should be considered paramount and should prevail in case
of conflict with those of the international community. Precisely
for this reason, and in spite of occasional accusations, other federal constitutions established a distinct system of interspatial
conflicts in addition to a system of international conflicts.
IV
The extensive use of the comparative method by Ehrenzweig,
and the frequent reference to civilian institutions and literature,
should be regarded as a major contribution. Indeed, comparative study of procedural institutions has attracted little attention
in this country, and pieces of information contained in the Trea
ise are very valuable.
However, reference to civilian institutions is not always accompanied by adequate explanation, and thus, meaningful comparison by the uninformed reader is frequently made impossible. 12 Further, over-generalized reference to the "civilian" approach or to "civil law systems" may not always be an accurate
basis for suggesting functional equivalents. This is particularly
so with regard to such broad concepts as "jurisdiction" and
"competence."' 3 Ehrenzweig states, for example, that in "civil
12. See, e.g., p. 183, concerning a "deep cleavage" between civil law and common law conceptions of adoption; p. 212, "Exequatur." Of. Currie, Book Review,
73 HARV. L. REV. 801, 807 (1960).
13. The term competence (in German "Zustiindigkeit," in French "competence") refers to the authority of a concrete court to render a valid judgment in
a concrete case. See ROSENBERG, LEHRBUCH DES DEUTSCHEN ZIVILPROZESSRECHTS
116 (1954); MOREL, PROC]tDURE CIviLE 117 (1949); CORNU, PROCItDURE CIVILE
131 (1958). Competence is further analyzed in terms of subject matter competence (in German "Sachliche Zustlindigkeit," in French "competence d'attribution,
ratione materiae"), and local competence (in German "Ortliche Zustiindigkeit,"
in French "competence territoriale, ratione personae vel loci"). See ROSENBERG,

op. cit. supra, at 117; MOREL, op. cit. supra, at 181, 218; CORNU, op. cit. supra, at
224.
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law" "jurisdictional defects are procedural in character and thus
curable," (p. 74) which is not necessarily so with regard to all
civil law systems and all possible cases. 14 Actually, this statement seems to convey an over-simplified idea of what we may
term civilian conceptions of jurisdiction.
Further, Ehrenzweig's much too sketchy analysis of civilian
conceptions in this area may lead to a number of misconceptions
in this country. The attention of the reader is not called to the
fact that Ehrenzweig actually discusses procedural problems of
a domestic nature 5 rather than the foundation of a state's (or a
court's) authority to settle disputes involving international contacts. And thus, though accurate in terms of what happens in a
non-conflicts situation, the discussion becomes misleading with
regard to what happens in the field of (international) conflicts
and in case of proceedings brought for the enforcement of foreign judgments.
An accurate analysis of civilian conceptions would necessitate distinction in clear terms between "local jurisdiction" (to
use Ehrenzweig's terminology, although the term "state jurisdiction" would be preferable) and "international jurisdiction"
as one of the requirements for the recognition of foreign judgments.
"Local jurisdiction" (in German "Gerichtbarkeit," in French
"jurisdiction") ordinarily refers to the power or authority of a
state (which in absence of international obligation is unlimited)
to have disputes settled by its courts. 16 In the United States,
"local jurisdiction" in proceedings in personam is said to rest on
the requirement of proper service of process, which has been
elevated to a constitutional principle. The requirement of proper
14. In

fact, civilian theory distinguishes among non-existing, void, and void-

able judgments, which means that in some cases some procedural defects are
incurable. Lack of proper service, and non-compliance with rules pertaining to
"local competence," may be curable with regard to the validity of the judgment
within the state, but this is not so in case of proceedings brought in another state
for the enforcement of such judgment. See note 17 infra. Finally, lack of "subject matter" competence may be an incurable defect. See CORNU, PROCADURE
CIVILE 442 (1958); MOREL, PROCtDURE CIvIILE 178 et seq. (1949). But ci.
ROSENBERG, LEIRBUCH DES DEUTSCIIEN ZIVILPROZESSREcHTS 119, 718 (1954).
15. Of. p. 79 ("jurisdiction with sole regard to the domestic contacts with the
case") ; p. 98 ("civilian experience with [the property forum] not an altogether
happy one"); p. 208 ("location of property in the forum state as just another
basis of the foreign court's competency").
16. Cf. ROSENBERG, LEIIRBUCI
DES DETUTSCHEN
ZIVILPROZESSRECIITS
30
(1954); RIEZLER, INTERNATIONAL ZIVILPROZESSRECHT 198 (1949); MOREL,
PROC1tDURE CIVILE 77 (1949); CUOIIE, PROCtDURE CIVILE ET COMMERCIALE 48
(1958).
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service may thus affect the validity of a judgment both in the
rendering state and in any other sister-state where proceedings
may be brought for its enforcement. In civil law countries,
"local jurisdiction" is not founded on personal service but on
other considerations; and in spite of lack of personal service a
judgment may be valid within the state. But in case of proceedings brought for the enforcement of such a judgment in another
state, lack of personal service in the rendering state may exclude
7
recognition.1
There is no uniform "civil law" approach to the problem of
"local jurisdiction." Thus in Germany, such jurisdiction depends
(with some exceptions) on the availability of a court having
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the dispute and locally
competent to hear the case.' In France, "local jurisdiction" is
grounded on the French nationality of the plaintiff or defendant.19 This means that French citizens may bring action (at a
court of their domicile) against foreigners not domiciled in
France, and even in the absence of a locally competent court ;20
and under similar circumstances, a foreigner domiciled in
France may bring action against a French citizen domiciled
abroad. 2 1 This goes much further than our rule of transient
jurisdiction and illustrates the fact that in France, and several
other countries following the French system, "local jurisdiction"
is not always founded on close contacts between the forum and
22
the subject matter of the dispute.
Finally, with regard to judgment recognition, both in France
and Germany, one of the requirements of such recognition is
that the foreign state had "international jurisdiction." This
jurisdiction is tested uniformly according to notions prevailing
at the recognizing forum. In such cases the courts answer the
hypothetical question whether under similar circumstances they
23
would be able to hear the case.
17. See RIEZLER, INTERNATIONALES ZIVILPROZESSRECHT 535 (1949); Z.P.O.
:328.1.2. See also ROSENBERG, LEHRBUCH DES DEUTSCHEN ZIVILPROZESSRECHTS
702 (1954). This seems to be the rule in Germany, Austria, Italy, and France.
18. See RIEZLER, INTERNATIONAL ZIVILPROZESSRECHT 219 (1949); ROSENBERG, LEHRBUCH DES DEUTSCHEN ZIVILPROZESSRECHTS 65 (1954).
19. See RIEZLER, INTERNATIONALES ZIVILPROZESSRECHT 274 (1949).
20. See FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 14; MOREL, PROCtDURE CIVILE 223 (1949);
CUCHE, PROCADUBE CIVILE ET COMMERCIALE 205 (1958).
21. See FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 15.
22. Cf. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1959) : "[In civil law] such rules
now permit the courts to take jurisdiction with sole regard to the domestic contacts with the case."
23. See RIEZLER, INTERNATIONALES ZIVILPROZESSRECHT 532 (1949): ROSENBERG, LEHRBUCH DES DEUTSCHEN ZIVILPROZESSEECHTS

701 (1954).
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V
One may disagree with Ehrenzweig's arrangement and
method of presentation. A wealth of materials and ideas included in the Treatise may raise some scepticism as to whether
or not such inclusion was justified. I refer to a number of long
historical digressions, and efforts at reformulation of domestic
rather than conflicts law, as in the case of arbitration agreements and rules governing collateral estoppel. In both areas, the
discussion of domestic law is most enlightening, but relatively
short space is devoted to the analysis of attendant conflicts problems. Perhaps this is due to the scarcity of conflicts materials,
and the need for placing the domestic law on a more rational
ground before suggesting solutions for conflicts problems.
Ehrenzweig's style is compact, and, at times, elliptical. The
Treatise is replete with original ideas, illustrations, references,
and cross-references to preceding and following sections in the
same work. This, at times, may account for a certain degree of
difficulty in following the main line of thought.
One may also disagree with some of Ehrenzweig's conclusions
drawn from both statutory materials and case law. 24 For example, it is stated that "In personal actions arising out of maritime occurrences and transactions, federal district courts sitting
in admiralty have exclusive jurisdiction when relief other than
a money judgment is sought, and concurrent jurisdiction with
the state courts in certain other cases." (p. 78) It seems that
the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts in personal
actions (libels in personam) is always concurrent with that of
the state courts, and that federal admiralty courts have exclusive jurisdiction where relief in the nature of in rem relief is
sought.25 Further, the admiralty jurisdiction of federal courts
(both exclusive and concurrent) to grant "relief other than a
26
money judgment" is extremely limited in scope.

VI
Reservations, disagreements, and criticism apart, the Treatise of Professor Ehrenzweig remains a landmark in our litera24. Cf. Hazard, Book Review, 24 Mo. L. REV. 406, 408 (1960) ; Cavers, Book
Review, 47 CALIF. L. REV. 414, 416 (1960) ; Currie, Book Review, 73 HARV. L.
REV. 801, 803-04, 807 (1960).
25. See GILMORE & BLACK, ADMIRALTY 33 (1957), and cases cited.
26. Id. at 37.
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ture on the Conflict of Laws. The product of mature scholarship, and a protest against conceptualism, the Treatise marks a
new beginning. As the author wanted it, the work will be valuable in the hands of teachers, students, and practicing lawyers.
The teacher will be able to start his own analysis on a number of issues raised by Ehrenzweig with regard to which the law
seems self-contradictory and confused; the student will have a
panoramic picture of the law surrounding embattled issues; and
the practicing lawyer will find a treasure chest of ideas for better counselling in the field of conflict of laws.
A. N. Yiannopoulos*
*Research Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.

